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 Th e Struggle for Sentencing Reform
 Will the English Sentencing Guidelines Model Spread? 
 Cyrus Tata * 
 A.  Sentencing Reform and Guidelines in 
England and Wales and Beyond 
 Are closely comparable common-law countries following the path forged by England 
and Wales by moving towards the development of systematic sentencing guidelines 
by a Sentencing Council? And if they are not, how are these diﬀ erent paths explica-
ble? Th is chapter examines whether the approach of England and Wales has or will 
spread to its nearest neighbour, Scotland. In so doing, the chapter aims to contribute 
to the international endeavour to understand the politics and conditions of sentencing 
reform. 
 It will be argued that the political support for the development of guidelines 
and a Council is a response to one or more of ﬁ ve broad aspirations, support for which 
tend to inspire and motivate sentencing reform worldwide. Th ese aspirations are 
expressed in distinct ways in diﬀ erent countries. In Scotland, a series of reforms have 
had the eﬀ ect of diverting support from the introduction of systematic guidelines 
and a Council. Instead of appearing to confront judicial ownership of sentencing, 1 
Scottish policy has largely sought to coax, enable, and persuade sentencing judges 
to choose to adjust their decision-making. 
 By charting key developments in Scottish sentencing policy, it will be argued that 
this largely voluntary and permissive approach has dominated Scottish policy-making 
discourse in part  because it appears to stand ﬁ rm against a supposedly more prescriptive, 
punitive, and less humane approach thought to be exempliﬁ ed by systematic guidelines 
in England and Wales. In that sense, it is important to understand Scottish sentencing 
policy-making in the context of Scottish perceptions about and resistance to its 
 *  I would like to express my gratitude to Andrew Ashworth, Julian Roberts, Neil Hutton, and Jay 
Gormley for their valuable comments and advice on an earlier draft of this paper. 
 1  Th is is not to say that in England and Wales the ownership of sentencing has been wrested from 
the judiciary. Like its predecessor, the Council has an in-built judicial majority. Rather, the point here 
is about perception in Scotland. 
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larger neighbour to the south, and a self-conscious pride in Scotland’s separate legal 
and civic national identity. Yet while the approaches of both jurisdictions clearly 
diﬀ er and those diﬀ erences are magniﬁ ed in political discourse, they nonetheless 
present shared problems, not least achieving impact on sentencing practice. 
 Why focus on Scotland? 
 Scotland represents an ideal comparator with England and Wales. Although a 
constituent part of the United Kingdom, Scotland’s legal system is independent 
from the rest of the UK. Criminal law in Scotland has always been separate and 
distinct, as is criminal justice, with separate institutions (police, prosecution, courts, 
prisons, community penalties, etc). Unlike a federal system where serious matters 
or criminal appeals might be heard in the federal capital, criminal appeals are heard 
in the Scottish capital (Edinburgh), not in London. In other words, it makes little 
sense to talk, as some otherwise excellent texts about criminal justice in England 
and Wales do, of ‘the UK criminal justice system’ or ‘UK sentencing’—there really 
is no such thing. 
 Th at said, while the law, procedures and practices  are distinctive on either side 
of the border, they are not mutually unrecognizable—in a way that can be the case 
when comparing say England and Wales with the USA. Th ere are three reasons. 
First, writers on political culture have noted important diﬀ erences in public attitudes 
(such as greater support for welfare and higher taxation in Scotland), 2 but these are 
framed within an uneasy relationship with the ‘Union State’ 3 of the UK. Second, 
criminal justice media stories are routinely reported as if UK-wide. So, while Scots 
law and justice are formally distinct from England and Wales, they are framed 
within wider political and media discourses. Th ird, important inﬂ uences which 
aﬀ ect criminal justice in Scotland emanate from or are mediated via London. One 
obvious example which indirectly aﬀ ects criminal justice lies in matters reserved 
for the UK Parliament, such as changes to the welfare system. Another example 
is that while the systems of criminal law are separate, it is the UK as a whole (not 
Scotland) which is a signatory to the ECHR and member of the European Union 
and Council of Europe, all of which can have a profound inﬂ uence on Scots criminal 
law, procedure, and justice. 4 For these reasons, the two national jurisdictions are 
natural close comparators—diﬀ erent enough yet close enough—to yield valuable 
and useable results. 
 2  Together with a parliamentary electoral system which facilitates coalition government, these dif-
ferences may have useful implications in literature seeking to understand the drivers of punitiveness 
(eg, N Lacey,  Th e Prisoners’ Dilemma: Political Economy and Punishment in Contemporary Democracies 
(2008); M Cavadino and J Dignan,  Penal Systems: A Comparative Approach (2006); D Garland,  Th e 
Culture of Control (2001)). 
 3  N Walker,  Final Appellate Jurisdiction in the Scottish Legal System (Scottish Government, 2010). 
 4  See also A Ashworth, ‘European Sentencing Traditions: Accepting Divergence or Aiming 
for Convergence?’ in C Tata and N Hutton (eds)  Sentencing and Society: International Perspectives 
(2002) pp 219–36; see also  Scottish Journal of Criminal Justice Studies vol 18, especially E Baker,  ‘Th e 
European Criminal Justice Jigsaw and its Relevance to Scotland’ (2012)  Scottish Journal of Criminal 
Justice Studies  18 :  5–25 , and Hope, the Rt Hon Lord,  ‘Th e Role of the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom’ (2012)  Scottish Journal of Criminal Justice Studies  18 :  26–43 . 
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 Th is chapter tells the recent story of reform in Scotland and how and to what 
extent Scotland might follow (or heed the lessons from) its neighbour south of 
the border. It aims not only to provide some comparison and contrast with that of 
England and Wales, but also to address the more international question posed by 
Roberts: ‘Th e question is now whether other common law countries will heed the 
lessons from England and Wales.’ 5 
 Is Scotland heading in the same direction as England and Wales? Traditionally, 
the idea of any public position on ‘tariﬀ s’ or ‘going rates’ for diﬀ erent kinds of 
cases has largely been eschewed by the Court of Appeal in Scotland. 6 Recently, 
legislation 7 was passed which provides for a Sentencing Council with the ability to 
devise guidelines, conduct research, and promote public conﬁ dence. However, the 
proposal for Sentencing Council guidelines was passed by the Scottish Parliament 
in the face of ﬁ erce judicial opposition and, at the time of writing, there are no 
immediate plans to establish a Council, especially not one which would draft 
guidelines. 
 What, then, of guidelines in the form of general guidance from the appeal court? 
Although it has clear legislative authority to do so, 8 the Appeal Court in Scotland 
has traditionally been reluctant to issue guidelines and some have argued that the 
‘Court has shown no interest in developing guidelines’. 9 As we will see later in this 
chapter, very recently there appears to be an expectation that the Appeal Court may 
begin to look for more opportunities to issue guideline judgments. Yet compared to 
England and Wales, the approach remains relatively weak, limited, and ad hoc. 10 
 Why is this? After all ‘policy transfer’ between two national jurisdictions of 
Scotland and England and Wales is commonplace. Th is chapter seeks to explain 
how and why Scotland has not pursued appellate sentencing guidelines with much 
vigour, nor systematic guidelines developed by a ‘buﬀ er’ body, 11 nor indeed a 
major and explicit programme of sentencing reform more generally. Is this because 
Scottish sentencing has been subject to less criticism than elsewhere? Are the 
arguments for sentencing reform less relevant to Scotland? 
 5  J Roberts,  ‘Structured Sentencing: Lessons from England and Wales for Common Law 
Jurisdictions’ (2012)  Punishment & Society  14 (3):  267–88 at 283. 
 6  N Hutton, ‘Sentencing as a Social Practice’ in S Armstrong and L McAra (eds)  Perspectives on 
Punishment (2006), pp 155–74. 
 7  Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010. 
 8  Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, ss 118(7) and 189(7). 
 9  N Hutton, ‘Th e Sentencing Commission for Scotland’ in A Freiberg and K Gelb (eds)  Populism: 
Sentencing Councils and Sentencing Policy (2008). 
 10  In its written evidence to the Scottish Parliament Justice Committee on the Criminal Justice and 
Licensing Bill 2009, the judges of the High Court of Justiciary acknowledged that to date the power 
to issue guideline judgments had been used ‘somewhat sparingly’ but signalled a new intention: ‘Th e 
court is now taking a pro-active attitude by seeking to identify cases which would beneﬁ t from guideline 
judgments’ (para 6). 
 11  ‘Buﬀ er’ is the term commonly used for permanent bodies like sentencing councils in that they 
seek to insulate sentencing practice and policy from the caprice of politics. See, eg, A Freiberg and 
K Gelb,  Penal Populism, Sentencing Councils and Sentencing Policy (2008). 
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 B.  Why has Scotland not pursued a similar 
approach to England and Wales? 
 Arguments worldwide for sentencing guidelines and sentencing reform tend to 
be inspired and sustained by ﬁ ve broad aspirations. Th ese aspirations are the intel-
lectual and rhetorical resources that calls for reform may draw upon. As such they 
form the basis of a potential coalition of support for any given reform project, 
including guidelines. One possible explanation why Scotland has not pursued 
the direction of England and Wales is that one or more of these aspirations is 
 perceived to be signiﬁ cantly less pertinent to the Scottish sentencing scene. Let us 
consider these ﬁ ve aspirations 12 in turn so as to assess whether they also pertain 
to Scotland. 
 Legal equality including the promotion of genuine consistency in sentencing . Genuine con-
sistency is not the same thing as a uniformity of outcome which is blind to relevant and 
important diﬀ erences between cases. In the Scottish context, there tend to be two 
main objections to the attempt to strive for greater consistency. Th e ﬁ rst objection 
is one which is familiar to sentencing scholars worldwide and which we could term 
‘inter-case incommensurability’. 13 Th is is the mantra that there is no such thing as 
consistency because every case is unique and that therefore it is impossible to compare 
one case with another. If taken literally, this claim is as illogical as it is morally nihilistic. 
As Roger Hood exposed some 50 years ago, the claim of inter-case commensurability 
is illogical when set against the frequent plea to trust the experience of each individual 
sentence:
magistrates and judges frequently turn to precedent for their ruling and place 
particular value on their experience in sentencing. Now, if this experience is to 
be of value, then all cases cannot be unique, they must be comparable at least 
in some respects; and even if it is agreed that all cases are unique in some sense, 
this cannot be decisive in the practice of sentencing, for frequently decisions are 
reached with the aid of ‘experience’. 14 
 Th e second argument is more plausible. It runs something like this: Scotland is a rela-
tively small national jurisdiction and contrasts sharply with its larger neighbour. Unlike 
England and Wales, where nearly the vast majority of sentencing work is done by some 
27,000 lay magistrates, more than 75 per cent of the sentencing work is done by rela-
tively small number (under 250) of intermediate court judges, (known as Sheriﬀ s), 15 
who are lawyers by professional background, and so tend to be more tight-knit because 
 12  I accept, of course, that there can be legitimate debate about the precise number and labelling 
of these aspirations and that my categorization is necessarily a rough and ready simpliﬁ cation. I hope 
though the informed reader will at least regard these as recognizable. 
 13  I use this term rather than ‘individualized sentencing’, (which is the term sometimes used to 
denote this claim), as it is more precise than ‘individualized sentencing’, which can easily appear to be 
taken simply to mean paying attention to the individuality of cases. 
 14  R Hood,  Sentencing in Magistrates’ Courts: A Study in Variation of Policy (1962) p 16. 
 15  Including stipendiary Justices of the Peace (JPs) who sit in Glasgow, are not lay JPs but lawyers 
and have the same sentencing powers as Sheriﬀ s. Th ere are under 500 lay JPs in Scotland and they hear 
less than one-ﬁ fth of all criminal cases. 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Apr 09 2013, NEWGEN
15_AndrewAshworth240113OUK_Ch15.indd   236 4/9/2013   1:33:37 PM
Cyrus Tata 237
many have known each other as practising lawyers. So, the argument runs, Scotland is 
much less exposed to inter-sentencer disparities than its southern neighbour. 16 
 However, there is nonetheless evidence of a degree of inconsistency in sentenc-
ing practices 17 and, more to the point in terms of sentencing reform, it is also widely 
perceived. Indeed, the judicially led Sentencing Commission’s Report into consist-
ency took the view that it did not need to commission any research to be conducted 
because:
Whilst there may be limited empirical research evidence available that indicates 
that sentencing in Scotland lacks consistency and shows the extent and preva-
lence of such inconsistency, we are persuaded that there is a signiﬁ cant body of 
anecdotal evidence which demonstrates that inconsistency in sentencing actually 
occurs. Whatever the actual degree of inconsistency in sentencing in Scotland, 
we are satisﬁ ed that there is a very clear perception amongst both practitioners 
and the public in general that sentencing in this country is inconsistent. Such a 
perception is damaging to public conﬁ dence in the criminal justice system. 18 
 Despite this, as recently as 2009 some senior legal and judicial ﬁ gures expressed the view 
that consistency is not possible in a system that treats each case on its individual merits; 
and that in any event there is no evidence of inconsistency. Th e Scottish Parliament did 
not accept this view and passed legislation based on the need to improve consistency in 
sentencing. In other words, the consistency argument for sentencing reform in Scotland 
is reasonably strong. However, in a national jurisdiction which has around one tenth 
of the population of England and Wales, and where most of the sentencing is done by 
judges who are lawyers rather than lay magistrates, the anxiety about disparity is not 
nearly as prominent in Scotland as it appears to be south of the border. 
 Th e need for greater predictability in sentencing patterns . Often a spin-oﬀ  of consist-
ency, the argument for reform based on predictability emphasizes its eﬃ  ciency gains for 
the wider criminal justice system, including the planning and resourcing of functions 
 16  On relative size of jurisdictions as an important constituent of self-image, see also O’Malley, this 
volume. 
 17  Scottish Government data might appear to suggest evidence of disparity between courts (see, 
eg, the reports ‘Costs, Sentencing Proﬁ les and the Scottish Criminal Justice System’ which have been 
produced annually under s 306 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995). However, in com-
mon with other oﬃ  cially derived data suggesting disparity in other countries, this data does not make 
suﬃ  ciently control relevant variables (eg, multi-conviction as opposed to single conviction cases, seri-
ousness of the oﬀ ence, previous convictions) to make genuinely meaningful comparisons. For more 
controlled studies suggesting evidence of widespread disparity: see C Tata and N Hutton,  ‘What 
“Rules” in Sentencing? Consistency and Disparity in the Absence of Rules’ (1998)  Th e International 
Journal of the Sociology of Law  26 (3):  339–64 ; A Creamer, L Hartley, and B Williams,  Th e Probation 
Alternative: A Study of the Impact of Four Enhanced Probation Schemes on Sentencing Outcomes (1992) 
p 12; C Tata,  ‘In the Interests of Clients or Commerce? Legal Aid, Supply, Demand, and “Ethical 
Indeterminacy” in Criminal Defence Work’ (2007)  Journal of Law and Society  34 (4):  489–519 at 
514–5; simulation exercises in research into pre-sentence reports as well as their ‘live’ use, C Tata, 
S Halliday, N Hutton, and F McNeill,  ‘Advising and Assisting the Sentencing Decision Process: Th e 
Pursuit of “Quality” in Pre-Sentence Reports’ (2008)  British Journal of Criminology  48 :  835–55 . In 
acknowledging that the data is limited, similar weaknesses are found in disparity research elsewhere, 
most of which relies on oﬃ  cial data sources and thereby provides a rather crude, even misleading, 
comparison between cases: see C Tata,  ‘Conceptions and Representations of the Sentencing Decision 
Process’ (1997)  Journal of Law and Society  24 (3):  395–420 . 
 18  Th e Sentencing Commission for Scotland,  Th e Scope to Improve Consistency in Sentencing: Report 
(Scottish Government, 2006) para 1.9. 
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such as imprisonment, community sanctions, the court service (eg, the diminution of 
‘judge shopping’), legal aid, pre-sentence report writing. Scotland is no more predictable 
than most other jurisdictions. 19 However, while the predictability and planning argument 
for reform are put forward by those concerned with the planning of custodial and commu-
nity resources it has not been prominently deployed in Scottish penal political debate. 
 Th e value of openness, including articulation, and transparency . Th rough greater openness 
in policy-making and in sentencing decision-making, it is widely believed that key beneﬁ ts 
will ﬂ ow. Th ese include: reason-giving, the development of reasoning; opportunities for 
a degree of democratic input. 20 While it would be diﬃ  cult to make a convincing case that 
Scottish sentencing practices are signiﬁ cantly more open than that of its neighbours, 
openness has not been a major rallying call for sentencing reform in Scotland. 
 Th e promotion of public conﬁ dence in sentencing. Research into public opinion, attitudes, 
and knowledge in Scotland reveals broadly similar misconceptions and a pervasive 
belief in leniency similar to that which research found in England and Wales. 21 Th e 
separate tabloid press in Scotland tends to be highly critical of ‘soft touch Scotland’ 
including what international readers will recognize as the familiar portrayal of: lenient 
sentencing; the apparent hypocrisy of ‘early release’; and the perceived ability of oﬀ end-
ers to avoid a proportionate punishment through sentencing discounting for guilty 
pleas. Th e desire to increase public conﬁ dence has been prominent in motivating and 
justifying the case for sentencing reform, especially in the desire to encourage support 
for greater penal moderation. 
 A Change in Penal Direction. Th e desire to change the penal direction of sentencing 
(more or less severe) generally or in a particular way is a frequent driving argument for 
reform. Unlike the USA, Jones and Newburn show that ‘UK’ 22 sentencing policy has 
not, save for the tabloid press, been signiﬁ cantly aﬀ ected by a ‘get tough’ lobby seeking 
harsher sentencing. Instead broadly liberal bodies argue for greater penal moderation, 
which is the goal of many, but by no means all, of those seeking sentencing reform. Most 
common is the aspiration among reformers for greater penal parsimony, especially in the 
use of custody as a sentence. 
 At ﬁ rst blush, the aim of achieving some change in penal direction seems not to have 
much connection with guidelines. For instance, it is barely mentioned in legislation, 
nor in oﬃ  cial documentation about the guidelines of England and Wales. Indeed, the 
connection is not a logical or necessary one. However, I would suggest that although 
oﬃ  cial documentation tends to avoid explicit mention of this goal explicitly, it is often 
implicit. Furthermore, penal moderation has been and continues to be a key aspiration 
 19  Audit Scotland,  Managing Increasing Prisoner Numbers in Scotland (2008). 
 20  See for instance Reitz, this volume; M Miller,  ‘Guidelines are Not Enough: Th e Need for Written 
Sentencing Opinions’ (1989)  Behavioural Science and the Law  7 (1) Winter; D Th omas,  ‘Sentencing—
the Case for Reasoned Decisions’ [1963]  Crim LR  245–53 . While I agree reason-giving is a good 
thing, there are also good grounds for scepticism about the eﬃ  cacy of reason-giving as a simple and 
unmediated exposition of reasoning: see C Tata, ‘Accountability for the sentencing decision process—
towards a new understanding’ in C Tata and Hutton (eds)  Sentencing and Society: International 
Perspectives (2002) pp 399–420. 
 21  S Anderson, D Ingram, and N Hutton,  Public Attitudes Towards Sentencing and Alternatives to 
Imprisonment , Scottish Parliament Paper 488 (2002); N Hutton,  ‘Beyond Populist Punitiveness?’ 
(2005)  Punishment & Society  7 (3):  243–58 . 
 22  T Jones and T Newburn,  Policy Transfer and Criminal Justice (2006). Th roughout Jones and 
Newburn refer to ‘the UK’ though in fact their study is only of England and Wales, rather than 
Scotland or Northern Ireland. However, this speciﬁ c point about the contrast with USA is true for 
Scotland also. 
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motivating and sustaining the support of a key constituency in a coalition of opinion in 
favour of systematic guidelines. Th is is not to say that guideline reform in England and 
Wales has, does, or ever will achieve greater penal moderation—it may or it may not. 23 
Rather, the point is that for some, guideline reform should be supported because it 
holds out the chance of realizing the aspiration of greater penal moderation. 
 Th e penal moderation agenda is arguably implicit in references to ‘cost eﬀ ectiveness’, 
‘value for money’ ‘predictability’, ‘impact on the wider system’. All of these terms have 
the potential to open up questions about the judicial use of custody as a sanction. 
 Th e birth of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, which provided for the new Sentencing 
Council, can be traced to the government’s desire to counter the steep rise in the prison 
population due to the increasing use of custody at sentencing. 24 Th e 2007 Carter Review 
of sentencing argued for a means of gaining some control of the burgeoning prison 
population. 25 Reitz describes the failure of the legislation which set up the Sentencing 
Council ‘to eﬀ ect what many would have said was its animating purpose’, 26 namely 
addressing the problem of prison population growth. So even though the goal of penal 
moderation was eventually largely frustrated, guidelines continue to oﬀ er the hope of 
achieving that goal—if not now then in the future. Th ose proponents of guidelines who 
also seek greater penal moderation tend to acknowledge that the ability of guidelines 
to achieve greater penal moderation is far from assured, but is the best hope, 27 or, as 
Morgan has put it, ‘the only potentially progressive policy approach available’. 28 
 In the work of non-oﬃ  cial Sentencing Commissions, the goal of encouraging greater 
parsimony in the use of custody is more explicit. For instance, Hough and Jacobson argue 
that one of the two main aims of the Sentencing Commission should be: ‘Achieving greater 
consistency and stability in sentencing practice, thereby preventing any further upward 
drift in sentencing severity’ and thus reducing the problem of ‘prison over-use’. 29 
 Among most academics, criminal justice practitioners and policy groups there tends 
to be ‘widespread agreement that any sensible crime control policy must include scaling 
back our use of custody’. 30 ‘Penologists and penal administrators treat it as axiomatic.’ 31 
 Nonetheless, the connection between support for sentencing guidelines and support 
for the reduction the use of custody is highly contingent. In this there is debate about 
the practical stance which the penal reformer should take. What is the appropriate bal-
ance between the ‘reform’ and ‘restatement’ of existing practices in the use of custody? 
Can restatement be a form of subtle reform? 32 One may take the pragmatic view that 
penal moderation is an important and worthy goal and hope that greater consistency and 
predictability will be a step towards that goal. In other words, support for systematic 
 23  In this much depends on the detailed content and format of guidelines but also the political 
climate which envelopes their practical interpretation. 
 24  Roberts, above note 5. 
 25  Lord Carter,  Securing the Future: Proposals For the Eﬃ  cient and Sustainable Use of Custody in 
England and Wales (2007). 
 26  Reitz, this volume. 
 27  Reitz, this volume. 
 28  R Morgan, ‘Where Now?’ in M Hough, R Allen, and E Solomon (eds)  Tackling Prison 
Overcrowding: Build More Prisons? Sentence Fewer Oﬀ enders? (2008) pp 123–31 at 128. 
 29  M Hough and J Jacobson,  Creating a Sentencing Commission for England and Wales: an Opportunity 
to Address the Prisons Crisis (2008). 
 30  Morgan, above note 28, p 127. 
 31  A Ashworth, ‘Reducing the Prison Population in the 1980s: the Need for Sentencing Reform’ in 
 A Prison System for the Eighties and Beyond (1983) pp 1–20 at 1. 
 32  A Ashworth, ‘Devising Sentencing Guidance’ in K Pease and M Wasik (eds)  Sentencing Reform: 
Guidance or Guidelines? (1987). 
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guidelines partly comes from those who see it as ‘a vehicle for a reduced rate of 
imprisonment’. 33 
 Th e tactical dilemma facing academics who are able to convert the aspiration of 
penal moderation into policy action is a familiar one: how far can one coax a conserva-
tive judiciary, and elected politicians, in the direction of penal moderation before one 
loses their support? For instance, having argued explicitly for systematic guidelines 
and a sentencing council as a means of addressing the pressing need for greater parsimony 
in the use of custody, 34 Andrew Ashworth chose to develop a more inclusive position 
explaining that he had:
abjured the aim of reducing the prison population by means of sentencing guid-
ance, which may seem particularly strange in view of my previous pronounce-
ments. 35  I have not changed my view on what is desirable, but I am seeking to suppress 
that personal view in the hope of putting forward a scheme whose acceptance would 
not depend on one’s view of the prison population . 36 
 In other words, the explicit guideline objectives of consistency and predictability are 
 not necessarily underpinned by a motivation to achieve penal parsimony: one can want 
consistency and not be much interested in the use of custody. Th is more minimal posi-
tion can sustain another key element in building a coalition of support for systematic 
guidelines. Nonetheless, there is also a signiﬁ cant body of opinion which believes 
that penal parsimony could be more easily achieved through guidelines than without 
guidelines. For these penal moderates, systematic guidelines oﬀ er the chance to alter 
the direction of sentencing. 
 Is penal moderation an aspiration that is pertinent to Scotland? Th ere has been 
and continues to be an important argument in response to the idea of guidelines as a 
means of encouraging penal parsimony in Scotland. Th is lies in the belief that Scottish 
penal culture has strongly embedded and distinctive values which militate against the 
more mechanical and punitive approach of its English neighbours. Scotland is said to 
have ‘retained a distinctively welfare approach’ 37 and to have been ‘relatively immune 
from the populist tendencies that were rapidly infecting its southern neighbour’. 38 
Indeed, it is a fairly widespread view north of the border that the penal landscape is 
less harsh and more humane than that of England and Wales. Not infrequently, this is 
attributed to a culturally distinct Scottish national identity which stands in contradis-
tinction to and resistance of the approach south of the border. For instance:
Scottish cultural identity, which has for centuries been constructed in opposition 
to its neighbours south of the border, together with civic pride in the mainte-
nance of its separate legal system as guaranteed under the Act of Union 1707, 
appears to have contributed to a less populist approach to penal matters. 39 
 Th ree examples tend to be cited in support of this view of Scotland as pursuing a more 
humane and less punitive approach than England and Wales. First, and most notably, 
 33  Morgan, above note 28, p 131. 
 34  Ashworth, above note 31. 
 35  Ashworth, above note 31. 
 36  Emphasis added. Ashworth, above note 32, pp 81–2. 
 37  H Croall,  ‘Criminal Justice in Post-Devolutionary Scotland’ (2006)  Critical Social Policy ,  26 (3): 
 587–607 at 589. 
 38  Cavadino and Dignan, above note 2, p 231. 
 39  A Millie, J Tombs, and M Hough,  ‘Borderline sentencing: A Comparison of Sentencers’ Decision 
Making in England and Wales, and Scotland’ (2007)  Criminology & Criminal Justice  7 (3):  243–67 at 262. 
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Scotland has a unique welfare-based ethos of youth justice (known as ‘children’s 
hearings’) which is concerned with ‘the best interests of the child’ and has enjoyed 
‘continued support of key elites including the judiciary’, 40 largely (though not 
entirely) avoiding recourse to youth courts. Second, the traditional probation func-
tion based on welfare values has not been displaced so retaining an approach which 
is crime-reductive rather than a punitive. 41 Unlike probation oﬃ  cers in England and 
Wales, in Scotland, Criminal Justice Social Workers continue to be generically trained 
social workers, and are employed by local authorities rather than a central national 
oﬀ ender management body. Th ird, save for murder, mandatory minimum sentences 
(eg, three-strikes style laws) have not been implemented in Scotland. 
 Th is view of Scotland as more humane and less punitive tends to be based on the 
sense that a small, patrician, liberal-minded elite of oﬃ  cials, judges, and other leading 
practitioners succeeded in running penal policy-making more or less ‘under the radar’ of 
politicization—a position which some have argued receded after the reintroduction of a 
Scottish Parliament in 1999. 42 
 All of this might suggest that Scotland has (or at least had) avoided relatively high 
rates of imprisonment and high levels of public cynicism about criminal justice. 
However, neither is or appears to have been the case. Scotland’s rate of imprisonment 
has long been relatively high and similar to that of England and Wales. Importantly, 
this has been recognized by successive Scottish administrations, leading third sector 
bodies, and Audit Scotland as something which needs to be addressed, most recently 
in the work of the 2008 Prisons Commission. In other words, there is strong support 
among criminal justice policy elites for greater penal moderation. Yet there is relatively 
sparse support for systematic guidelines developed by a Council. 
 Albeit in slightly diﬀ erent combination, I have suggested that the ﬁ ve aspirations 
that motivate and inspire the case for systematic guidelines, a sentencing council 
and reform more generally are also found in Scotland. Why, then, has there not 
been a signiﬁ cant programme of reform of the kind seen in England and Wales? 
I shall suggest that in fact there have been a series of initiatives which have been 
motivated by these ﬁ ve aspirations and  which in the politics of sentencing were pre-
sented as alternatives to systematic guidelines drafted by a Council, or, indeed, any 
other form of ‘interference’ in sentencing policy. 
 C.  Sentencing Reforms in Scotland without 
(or as an Alternative to) Guidelines 
 Th e use of the Sentencing Information System 
in the aspiration of consistency 
 During the period when sentencing guideline reforms developed apace in England 
and Wales and elsewhere, one initiative in Scotland spanning the 1990s and 
 40  L McAra,  ‘Modelling Penal Transformation’ (2005)  Punishment & Society  7 (3):  277–302 . 
 41  Eg Millie et al, above note 39, 263. 
 42  Eg McAra, above note 40; L McAra,  ‘Crime, Criminology and Criminal Justice in Scotland’ 
(2008)  European Journal of Criminology  5 (4):  481–504 ; Cavadino and Dignan, above note 2, pp 
231–2; Croall, above note 37; Millie et al, above note 39. 
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early 2000s partly explains how Scotland, and more particularly the Scottish senior 
judiciary, has avoided guidelines. 
 In the early 1990s, the Conservative Secretary of State for Scotland, Michael 
Forsyth, proposed the introduction of mandatory minimum ‘two-strikes’ style cus-
todial sentences for some classes of cases. Th e senior judiciary at the time responded 
with its own initiative: a Sentencing Information System (SIS) which would show 
that it took seriously the public perception of inconsistent sentencing. Th e idea 
of the SIS was, and is, to use database technology to provide judicial sentencers 
with good quality systematic information about sentences passed (including those 
‘corrected’ on appeal) for similarly situated cases. In this way, the SIS was intended 
to aid the sentencing process and the judicial pursuit of consistency. Th e idea of 
providing judges with systematic information as an aid to consistency is not a new 
one. In 1953, Norval Morris suggested that trial judges be provided with data on 
sentences imposed so that they could ‘see clearly where they stand in relation to 
their brethren’. 43 However, it was not until the 1980s that systems were trialled 
in Canada by John Hogarth in British Columbia 44 and by Tony Doob in other 
Canadian provinces 45 both of which were later abandoned, and then in the late 
1980s by the Judicial Commission in New South Wales which continues to this 
day. 46 In 1993 after seeing the New South Wales SIS at a conference, the senior 
Scottish judiciary approached academics at Strathclyde University Law School for 
assistance and it was agreed that a study of the feasibility of introducing an SIS 
into the High Court should be undertaken. Th e feasibility study went on to create 
a prototype SIS. 
 In the understanding of the politics of sentencing reform, two aspects stand out. 
First, this was an initiative by the senior judiciary. Rather than waiting for legislation 
to be passed and then complaining about it (as happened elsewhere), the senior 
judiciary took the initiative. Taking such a proactive initiative is as unusual for the 
Scottish judiciary, as it is for most judiciaries elsewhere. It was prominently and 
favourably reported in the media. 47 Meanwhile, the government was content to 
allow the judiciary to take a lead and the initiative was also often cited in response 
to calls to restrict judicial discretion. In this way, the political function of the SIS 
was to head-oﬀ  populist pressure to ‘do something’ about sentencing. However, it 
was not a wholly presentational exercise: the two most senior judges at the time 
 43  Morris (1953) at 200 quoted in R Frase, ‘Sentencing Principles’ in M Tonry (ed) (1997)  Crime 
and Justice: A Review of Research 22: 366. 
 44  J Hogarth,  Sentencing Database System: User’s Guide (1988). 
 45  A Doob and N Park, ‘Computerised Sentencing Information for Judges: An Aid to the Sentencing 
Process’ (1987)  Criminal Law Quarterly 30: 54; A Doob, ‘Evaluation of a Computerized Sentencing 
Aid’,  Report of the Select Committee of Experts on Sentencing , (European Committee on Crime Problems, 
Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 1990). 
 46  C Tata,  ‘Resolute Ambivalence: Why Judiciaries do not Institutionalise their Decision Support 
Systems’ (2000)  International Review of Law, Computers and Technology  14 (3):  297–316 ; I Potas, 
‘Consistency of Approach in Sentencing: A Description of the Judicial Commission’s Sentencing 
Information System’ paper delivered to the workshop on ‘Decision Support Systems’, Melbourne 
(1997). 
 47  For example, Lord Ross gave an interview to Scotland’s biggest circulation newspaper,  Th e Daily 
Record : ‘Judges go Hi-Tech’/‘I want computers on the bench’ (14 October 1993). 
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who were behind the initiative, the Lord Justice General (Lord Hope) and the Lord 
Justice Clerk 48 (Lord Ross), were genuinely committed to the pursuit of consistency 
in sentencing and they saw this as inﬁ nitely preferable to guidelines or other forms 
of ‘interference’, such as mandatory minimum sentencing. 
 Second, the SIS in Scotland was not, and was never intended to be, something 
which was imposed upon the judges. Th e SIS was a system to be created by judges 
for judges. 49 Yet this point seems to have been lost in some accounts. For example, 
the widely cited neo-Foucauldian account by Franko Aas portrays the Scottish 
SIS as, alongside US federal guidelines, one of the main case studies exemplifying 
the loss of judicial discretion and wisdom replaced by hyper techno-rationality. 
However, the Scottish SIS was never to be ‘sentencing by computer’ in the way 
portrayed by Franko Aas’ account. 50 Far from it. Senior judges were to remain 
ﬁ rmly in control: the SIS was to be theirs alone for their use—it was directed by 
the senior judiciary for the senior court. On the grounds of it being a ‘pilot project’, 
the SIS was not publicly accessible. As well as the media, prosecution service, and 
defence lawyers, intermediate court judges 51 wanted access to the SIS or to create 
something like it for themselves. 52 Th ey were all to be denied access unless and 
until a decision had been taken by the senior judiciary about public access. 
 Moreover, the portrayal of the SIS to conjure a sense of dystopian technocracy is 
also wide of the mark: it neglects the fact that the degree of prescription was always 
to be non-binding and that judicial choice was an essential deﬁ ning feature. 53 Th at 
said, by describing the normality of sentencing there is also a normative implication, 
which was intended. 54 But prescription was to be suggestive only. 
 Conceived as a ﬂ exible tool, the SIS represented sentencing according to a range 
of diﬀ erent ways of conceiving ‘similarity’ in the same case. 55 Th e SIS is search-
able in a wide range of ways which allows the user a high level of ﬂ exibility so that 
patterns of case similarity can be deﬁ ned in a range of diﬀ erent ways (including 
both aggregate terms and by examining individual cases). In other words, the SIS 
does not attempt to direct the judge to ‘the correct’ sentence, but rather provide 
information about previous sentences passed (as ‘corrected’ by the Appeal Court) 
in similar cases. For some, 56 this lightness of direction was a fundamental error, but 
for others if nothing else it was a strength since it represented sentencing in more 
 48  Th e Lord Justice Clerk is the second most senior judicial position in Scotland after the Lord 
Justice General/Lord President. 
 49  C Tata,  ‘“Neutrality”, “Choice” and “Ownership” in the Construction, Use, and Adaptation of 
Judicial Decision Support Systems’ (1998)  Th e International Journal of Law and Information Technology 
 6 (2):  143–67 . 
 50  K Franko Aas,  Sentencing in the Age of Information: from Faust to Macintosh (2005). 
 51  Th ese judges are known as ‘sheriﬀ s’—lawyers by background who hear three-quarters of criminal 
cases. 
 52  Scottish Parliament Justice 1 Committee,  Oﬃ  cial Record Meeting no 4, Tuesday 18 February 
2003: col 4611–2. 
 53  Tata, above note 49. 
 54  Tata, above note 49. 
 55  Tata, above note 17. 
 56  Eg A Lovegrove,  ‘Statistical Information Systems as a Means to Consistency and Rationality in 
Sentencing’ (1999)  International Journal of Law & Information Technology  7 (1):  31–72 . 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Apr 09 2013, NEWGEN
15_AndrewAshworth240113OUK_Ch15.indd   243 4/9/2013   1:33:37 PM
Th e Struggle for Sentencing Reform244
realistic and acceptable ways. 57 Th is mirrors the tension between direction and 
judicial acceptance in the production of guidelines. 58 
 Implementation of the SIS was phased in during the late 1990s and responsibility 
handed over to the Scottish Court Service (SCS) in 2003. At that time, the SIS 
contained relatively in-depth information, and remains the best data available, 
on over 15,000 sentenced cases (including appeals) over the previous 15 years. 
Importantly, the information (categorization and classiﬁ cation) was devised in a 
way agreed with the judiciary. Th is quantitative information was supplemented by 
textual comments by individual judges where they felt it necessary to explain features 
not captured by data recording taxonomy. It was agreed that with the handover 
to the SCS, court clerks would take over recording of information. In the event, 
it became quickly apparent that the quality assurance processes recommended by 
the University Team were not going to be followed and it was decided by SCS that 
there would be no processes to ensure clerks recorded data, let alone accurately. 
Clearly there was no senior judicial lead requiring clerks to do so. Foreseeably, the 
SIS appears to have been quietly left to wither away. Why? 
 Two factors coincided. First, the immediate political pressure on the judiciary 
dissipated—the SIS had fulﬁ lled a tactical role to see oﬀ  political pressure for 
more intrusive reform. In contrast to England and Wales, in Scotland immediately 
after the reintroduction of a Scottish Parliament in 1999, judicial sentencing 
discretion had slipped down on the political agenda. Th e new Justice Minister 
took a more liberal and permissive approach regarding judicial sentencing discre-
tion as relatively benign. Second, the SIS lost its judicial champion. Soon after 
political pressure had receded, there was also a change in personnel at the apex of 
the judiciary, which was to prove critical. By the mid 1990s the two most senior 
judges who took the initiative for an SIS had left the scene: Lord Ross retired and 
Lord Hope (Lord Justice General) had been appointed to the House of Lords. 
Th e new Lord Justice Clerk (Lord Cullen) appeared deeply sceptical about the 
idea of an SIS and cooler about the involvement of external academics. By 1999, 
on the basis of a supposed breach of protocol, 59 Lord Cullen called a halt to any 
further work until the matter had been fully debated by all High Court judges. 
Although it was eventually decided that work could continue, progress to full 
implementation slowed and the arrangements to ensure proper data collection 
were frustrated. 
 Th e key underlying anxiety, which was never properly resolved, was who could 
have access to the SIS. Th e University Team recommended public access, propos-
ing that if managed in the appropriate way such access need not be a threat to the 
judiciary, but rather an opportunity to improve public understanding of sentencing. 
For example the SIS data could produce occasional reports about the true patterns 
 57  Tata, above note 49. 
 58  Roberts, above note 5. 
 59  In June 1999, I co-ran an international conference on sentencing. Following a university news 
release, BBC Radio asked me to give a short interview about the conference in which, among other 
subjects to be discussed, I mentioned brieﬂ y (and approvingly) the SIS, which was to be discussed later 
that day, by Lord Ross in the opening address to the conference. 
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of sentencing for diﬀ erent kinds of cases. 60 However, nervousness about access 
beyond the judiciary was coupled with an awareness that access could not be 
denied forever, especially once the SIS was no longer deemed to be ‘a pilot’ 
project. 61 Given that political pressure had dissipated by this point, the simplest 
approach was to wish the whole thing could be quietly forgotten. And that is 
largely what happened. 
 One possible criticism of an SIS is that, like guidelines, it tends simply to 
replicate existing practices. However, as Ashworth reminds us this exercise of 
clariﬁ cation and categorization (or codifying) is to some extent a ‘normative 
enterprise’. 62 In the same way, devising the SIS, especially in the case of Scotland 
which originated its own sentencing taxonomy, was a process of classifying and 
categorizing. In that process, lies a subtle potential for ‘incidental reform’, 63 
which might strike a balance between the demands of judicial acceptance and 
reform. 
 While the SIS was used in the political debate about sentencing reform as an 
alternative to guidelines (especially the US Federal variety), in fact an SIS can also 
be used as a complement to guidelines and ‘can be a boon to even the most suc-
cessful guideline systems’. 64 Th ere is no reason why the two approaches cannot be 
developed in parallel. Indeed they can be mutually complimentary and sustaining. 
A weakness in the development and monitoring of guidelines is a way of measuring 
practices in a way that is meaningful to sentencing. 65 Conversely, an SIS is weak in 
its formal authority 66 —a key quality of formal guidelines. Nonetheless, the potential 
for such synergy has tended to be lost in the somewhat polarizing discourse about 
reform in Scotland. 
 60  C Tata and N Hutton,  ‘Beyond the Technology of Quick Fixes: Will the Judiciary Act to Protect 
Itself and Shore up Judicial Independence’ (2003)  Federal Sentencing Reporter  6 (1). Th is could be 
particularly valuable given that the Scottish SIS was more or less unique in collecting information 
based on a taxonomy originated with the judiciary for the SIS project. Th e thinking was that oﬃ  -
cial data sources would not provide a meaningful comparison between cases from the perspective of 
sentencing. 
 61  By contrast, in the SIS which has recently been introduced into the Republic of Ireland an early 
decision was made to allow the information to be publicly accessible: T O’Malley,  Sentencing: Towards 
a Coherent System (2011) pp 156–84. 
 62  Ashworth, above note 32, p 82. 
 63  N Hutton, C Tata, and J Wilson,  ‘Sentencing and Information Technology: Incidental Reform?’ 
(1998)  International Journal of Law and Information Technology  2 (3),  255–86 . 
 64  M Miller, ‘Sentencing Reform: the Sentencing Information System Alternative to Guidelines’ in 
M Tonry (ed)  Th e Future of Imprisonment: Essays in Honour of Norval Morris (2004) pp 121–53. 
 65  Oﬃ  cial data sets tend to suﬀ er from various key problems worldwide. For instance, they tend to 
represent multi-conviction cases poorly and are generally weak in representing case seriousness. Th is 
is perhaps unsurprising given that they are produced for multiple purposes of which sentencing is 
only one. An SIS which collects information from the perspective of sentencing (and perhaps supple-
ments existing data in this way) can provide a vital resource to sentencing councils, policy-makers and 
criminal justice service planners. 
 66  For instance, M Tonry, ‘Punishment, Policies and Patterns in Western Countries’ in M Tonry 
and M Frase,  Sentencing and Sanctions in Western Countries (2000) pp 3–28 at 23 has suggested 
that an SIS is similar to voluntary guidelines. However, although choice is crucial there are some 
important distinctions between the two models, not least the way that ‘similar’ cases can be 
‘looked up’. 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Tue Apr 09 2013, NEWGEN
15_AndrewAshworth240113OUK_Ch15.indd   245 4/9/2013   1:33:37 PM
Th e Struggle for Sentencing Reform246
 Th e use of the promise of Appeal Court guideline 
judgments in the aspiration of consistency 
 With the prison population continuing to rise and concerns about public conﬁ dence, 
during the early-mid 2000s, a judicially led, but not overwhelmingly judicially 
dominated, short-life Sentencing Commission was established. 67 As its very ﬁ nal 
task, the Commission examined the issue of consistency. It accepted that there was 
inconsistency and recommended:
 the creation of a statutory body, the Advisory Panel on Sentencing in Scotland (APSS). 
Th at body would be responsible for the preparation of draft sentencing guidelines for 
consideration by the Appeal Court of the High Court of Justiciary. 
 However, the decision as to whether or not to adopt those guidelines would be a 
matter for the Appeal Court. 68 While it found little support among High Court 
judges, the Sentencing Commission detected support from intermediate court 
judges who ‘expressed some support for more extensive guidance on sentencing 
to be developed and promulgated by the Appeal Court, supported by a research 
facility, along the lines of the Sentencing Advisory Panel in England and Wales’. 69 
Th e Sentencing Commission proposed that the APSS be of ‘of similar composition 
and have similar powers to those of the Sentencing Advisory Panel in England and 
Wales’. 70 However, in embracing a model which England and Wales had discarded 
it appears that concerns about the loss of judicial ownership of sentencing were 
decisive:
 We regard this [Advisory Panel] approach as preferable to the creation of a sentencing 
commission, or a body like the Sentencing Guidelines Council in England and Wales, in 
which other individuals are involved along with judges not only in the drafting of such 
guidelines but also in their ﬁ nalisation and promulgation. We do not support such an 
innovation. While diﬀ erent models to that which we propose operate in other jurisdictions, 
we consider that in Scotland the Appeal Court should be allowed to remain in overall 
control of sentencing policy, subject of course to any legislation that either the Westminster 
Parliament or the Scottish Parliament may enact. 71 
 At the same time as sentencing reform was back on the political agenda, the mid 
2000s saw a small increase in Court of Appeal guideline judgments. 72 Th ere are 
still no more than a handful of guideline judgments 73 and they have tended to 
 67  See Hutton, above note 9. 
 68  Sentencing Commission for Scotland, above note 18. 
 69  Sentencing Commission for Scotland, above note 18, 8.37. 
 70  Sentencing Commission for Scotland, above note 18, 9.14. 
 71  Sentencing Commission for Scotland, above note 18, 9.15. Th e report of the Sentencing 
Commission also argues that England and Wales is a rather diﬀ erent place and preferred to see New 
Zealand as more comparable: ‘We have thought it appropriate to refer, somewhat extensively, to the 
developments in New Zealand because in terms of the size of its population it is similar to Scotland and, 
like Scotland, its criminal justice system is fundamentally a common law jurisdiction.’ para 7.10. 
 72  Renton and Brown  Criminal Procedure (6th edn) Part VII, ch 22. 
 73  Th e number of such judgments is debatable because: ‘Th e Court does not speciﬁ cally state that an 
Opinion issued is a guideline judgment, using its powers in the 1995 Act, and so relevant Opinions 
are neither reported nor indexed as such’: Sentencing Commission for Scotland (2006) above note 
18 at 4.11. 
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concentrate on certain subjects such as the ‘punishment part’ of life sentences and 
especially on the vexed question of sentence discounting for a guilty plea. 74 
 Recently, in direct response to the proposals for a Council with the power to 
develop guidelines to which objected in the strongest terms, the senior judiciary 
acknowledged that hitherto the power to issue guideline judgments had been used 
‘somewhat sparingly’ but promised a more proactive approach:
 Th e court is now taking a pro-active attitude by seeking to identify cases which would beneﬁ t 
from guideline judgments . . . A much less expensive course [than a Sentencing Council 
drafting guidelines] would be to develop and expand the present arrangements under which 
the court itself identiﬁ es cases which are suitable for guideline judgments . . . [and that a 
senior judge is] considering whether there would be advantage in enlarging the personnel 
who might be involved—possibly the legal profession or even wider interests. 75 
 However, as of late 2012, there had been no clear movement towards a signiﬁ -
cantly more proactive approach and there had been no move to establish the wider 
reference group. It appears that these comments were made in the context of the 
proposed legislation to create a sentencing council with the power to develop 
guidelines. Since that legislation has not yet been implemented it was felt that 
there was no requirement to create a reference group. 76 It is possible, then, that 
the apparent promise of a more proactive approach to appellate court guideline 
judgments may thus have been presented as a response to the perceived threat of 
guidelines drafted by an ‘external’ Council. In this way, the senior judicial response 
to the threat of external ‘interference’ appears to parallel that seen earlier in the 
history of the SIS. 
 In any event, whether or not these guideline judgments are succeeding in bring-
ing about greater consistency of approach is, as the English experience suggests, 77 a 
moot point. Before compliance is even practically possible, relevant actors need to 
understand what the law is. Th ere is some evidence, for example, that the practi-
cal eﬀ ect of sentence guideline judgments in guilty plea cases may be understood 
and interpreted in a range of rather disparate, even idiosyncratic, ways by law-
yers and judicial sentencers 78 and other relevant practitioners such as social work 
pre-sentence report writers. 79 Second, the law needs to be settled and clear which, 
as Leverick shows has not resulted from recent judgments which have left the posi-
tion on sentence discounting ‘in a state of some confusion’. 80 
 74  Eg  Du Plooy v HM Advocate [2005] JC 1;  Ogilvie v HM Advocate [2002] JC 74;  Spence v HM 
Advocate [2008] JC 174;  Gemmell v HM Advocate [2011] HCJAC 129. 
 75  Written submission of the judges of the High Court of Justiciary to the Justice Committee in 
response to the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Bill 2009, paras 6 and 14. 
 76  Th is view has been conﬁ rmed by private communications. 
 77  Ashworth, this volume, notes that: ‘What we do not have is reliable research into exactly how 
these major changes have aﬀ ected sentencing.’ 
 78  Tata, above note 17, pp 511–15. 
 79  C Tata,  ‘A Sense of Justice: Th e Role of Pre-sentence Reports in the Production and Disruption of 
Guilt and Guilty Pleas’ (2010)  Punishment and Society  12 (3):  239–61 . 
 80  F Leverick,  ‘Sentence Discounting for Guilty Pleas: a Question of Guidelines’ (2012)  Edinburgh 
Law Review  16 :  233–8 . 
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 Attempts to achieve greater penal moderation by indirect 
(subtle and surreptitious) means 
 Until the late 2000s the eﬀ orts to moderate the rate of imprisonment concentrated 
on two indirect strategies: subtle persuasion against the use of custodial sentences, 
and second, executive release. Both strategies are indirect and unlike systematic 
guidelines drafted by a Council do not appear to confront or problematize judicial 
‘ownership’ of sentencing. 
 Th e attempt to persuade judicial sentencers to make greater 
use of non-custodial sanctions, wherever possible. 
 Tying in with exhortation to judicial sentencers to use custody as a ‘last resort’, this 
approach has tended to task Criminal Justice Social Workers 81 with the job of achiev-
ing greater parsimony in the judicial use of custody. Rather than an open debate and 
discussion about the use of custody, successive governments have preferred to tackle the 
problem indirectly by requiring social workers to attempt to dissuade sentencers from 
using custody in marginal cases. 
 Th is is exempliﬁ ed in the use of pre-sentence reports 82 to ‘sell’ the advantages of 
non-custodial options to judicial sentencers in two ways. First, pre-sentence reports 
are also expected to ‘sell’ community sanctions as robust, and convincing. Second, at 
the level of individual cases, National Standards for the writing of these reports require 
criminal justice social work report writers to try to ‘promote’ non-custodial options 
wherever possible. Th e logic is that through neutral reporting, sentencers will come 
to understand and realize the beneﬁ ts of non-custodial options. A four-year study 
following pre-sentence reports from production to judicial interpretation found that 
this strategy of subtle inﬂ uence through the provision of (ostensibly neutral) informa-
tion and sweet reason does seem to work some of the time. But it can also backﬁ re: 
encoded messages are easily misunderstood, and are undermined by processual and 
institutional factors, and reports are ultimately unable to satisfy their principal read-
ers: judicial sentencers. 83 
 Th e use of executive release measures to relieve pressure on 
the prison population. 
 Weaver et al argue that while there are sound reasons for a policy of ‘early release’ (incen-
tivizing good behaviour and enabling the resettlement of prisoners), 84 in practice early 
release has increasingly been used as a tool to try to limit the growth in the custodial 
population. Unable to control prison numbers through the ‘front door’ of judicial 
sentencing, successive governments have increasingly relied on ‘back door’ executive 
release as a surreptitious way of, in eﬀ ect, re-sentencing. Th is political strategy is ulti-
mately self-defeating, not least in feeding public cynicism about the penal system and 
community supervision in particular. 
 An example of this failure was the attempt to ‘abolish automatic unconditional 
early release’ which, on the grounds of transparency and public conﬁ dence, three of 
 81  Roughly the equivalent of Probation Oﬃ  cers in England and Wales. 
 82  Known in Scotland as Social Work Reports and formerly known as Social Enquiry Reports. 
 83  Tata et al, above note 17. 
 84  B Weaver, C Tata, M Munro, and M Barry,  ‘Th e Failure of Recall to Prison: Early Release, 
Front-Door and Back-Door Sentencing and the Revolving Prison Door in Scotland’ (2012)  European 
Journal of Probation  4 (1):  85–98 . 
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the main political parties have committed themselves to in their manifestoes at the last 
two Scottish general elections. A radical attempt to do this was made at the tail-end 
of the Labour-led administration in 2007 enshrined in the unworkable Custodial 
Sentences and Weapons (Scotland) Act. Critics of this legislation argued it was illogi-
cal, would only feed public cynicism, and drive up the prison population. Th ere has 
been a quiet recognition that the 2007 Act is unworkable and so it remains unimple-
mented. Th e failure to analyse ‘back-door’ release decision-making in the context of 
‘front-door’ sentencing was the fundamental problem. Th e government felt unable to 
place front-door judicial sentencing on the agenda at all. 
 Like the strategy of subtle persuasion through pre-sentence reports, this strategy 
is characterized by attempts to limit the use of custody through indirect means; and a 
marked reluctance to confront judicial sentencing itself. 
 Th e pursuit of penal moderation by direct legislative prohibition 
 In his evaluation of how legislatures can reduce the use of custodial sentencing, 
Roberts has argued that legislatures in most countries have failed to accept their 
responsibility to structure sentencing, preferring to abdicate that responsibility for 
setting the normative framework for sentencing policy to judges in individual cases: 
‘It is a regrettable fact that legislatures around the world have proved reluctant to 
intervene in the sentencing process’. 85 
 Th is was certainly the position in Scotland—save for maximum penalties the 
legislative framework has been fairly permissive. Indeed until recently, government 
policy had been marked by a reluctance to confront discretion in judicial sentencing. 
However, following the Prison Commission 86 the minority Scottish National Party 
(SNP) Government set forward proposals which were, by the international standards 
noted by Roberts, a bold and radical move to reduce the use of short-term impris-
onment. Previously, Scottish administrations had sought to curb the prison population 
through indirect and surreptitious means. Now, in the late 2000s, the Scottish 
Government was doing what no administration had done in living memory by 
saying as part of an explicit ‘front-door’ penal reduction strategy that there should 
be the virtual end of short-term imprisonment. Th is approach was accompanied 
by a vigorous and high proﬁ le media campaign led by the Cabinet Secretary for 
Justice in the full knowledge that it would not be a vote winner. Indeed, argu-
ments for sentencing reform in Scotland were explicit in the run-up to proposals for 
a Sentencing Council. Th e Cabinet Secretary for Justice was vocal in arguing that 
prison is not working for what he called ‘the ﬂ otsam and jetsam’ of society and for 
a more sparing use of custody in relatively low level oﬀ ending. 
 To achieve penal moderation, the Scottish Government proposed a presump-
tion against custodial sentences of six months or less. 87 However, in the face of 
 85  J Roberts, ‘Reducing the use of custody as a sanction: a review of recent international experiences’ in 
M Hough, R Allen, and E Solomon (eds)  Tackling Prison Overcrowding: Build More Prisons? Sentence 
Fewer Oﬀ enders? (2008) pp 103–22 at 104. 
 86  Scottish Prisons Commission,  Scotland’s Choice: Report (2008). 
 87  Scottish Government,  Sentencing Guidelines and a Sentencing Council: Consultation and Proposals 
(2008). 
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robust opposition in the Scottish Parliament Justice Committee and ﬁ erce criticism 
from the judiciary this was halved to three months. It is too early to know for sure 
whether this provision has had the impact the Government and Prison Commission 
hoped for, or indeed, whether it has been counterproductive. Certainly, the prison 
population has not stopped rising and there have been anecdotal reports 88 that the 
provision has led to predictable (and predicted) inﬂ ationary eﬀ ects. Indeed, while 
the number of custodial sentences of less than three months has fallen sharply, 
there has been a notable increase in sentences of more than three months. 89 Second, 
it is arguable that the selection of time (three months) as the category for the 
reduction of the use of custody in non-violent cases is illogical. Among those who 
receive a sentence of three months or less are those convicted of violent oﬀ ences. 
Th ird, the policy is a public relations hostage to fortune which has, unsurprisingly, 
led to the portrayal of the law as an ass because it ‘prevents’ judges from sending 
‘violent thugs’ to prison. 
 Th e return of the indirect pursuit of penal moderation 
 Most recently, government energy has reverted to a focus on two ways in which it 
is hoped to achieve greater penal moderation without confronting the thorny issue 
of the ‘ownership’ of sentencing. Th ese are: 
 Implementation of the 2012 Report of the Commission on Women Oﬀ enders. Despite osten-
sibly dealing with women, in fact the scope of the report’s recommendations go much 
wider. Although the Report contains many welcome recommendations, it is doubtful 
whether its major aim of ﬁ nding a way of reversing the doubling of the incarceration 
of women over the past decade will be achieved. In keeping with decades of thinking 
about penal reduction, the report contained virtually no discussion about sentencing 
reform per se. Instead the major responsibility for reducing the use of custody is assigned 
to criminal justice social work through fundamental reorganization of ‘a cluttered 
landscape’. Once again, the idea is that judicial sentencers need to be persuaded of 
the value of non-custodial sanctions, and (save for the important proposals about the 
extension of judicial training), the chief responsibility for making less use of custody 
is placed at the door of criminal justice social work. 
 Th e development of problem-solving courts. Although Scotland has two pilot Drug 
Courts and fast-track specialist courts, it has no general problem-solving court. 
Whether or not such courts will achieve greater penal moderation is far from assured 
and much will depend on the processes and structures put in place. Nonetheless, 
problem-solving courts can foster the development of stronger professional relation-
ships and trust between professionals from diﬀ erent disciplines (eg, the judiciary, social 
work, health), and this has the potential to raise the awareness and understanding of 
judicial sentencers about the social conditions of oﬀ ending and the major challenges 
people face in desisting from crime. 
 88  Eg ‘Fears Short Term Jail Bid has Failed’  Th e Herald (16 July 2012). 
 89  Roberts, above note 85, pp 109–10; Scottish Parliament Justice Committee,  Oﬃ  cial Report on 
Oral Evidence on Criminal Justice & Licensing Bill (2009) col 218–220; Scottish Government,  Prison 
Statistics and Population Projections Scotland (2012). 
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 Public conﬁ dence and transparency 
 Sentencing guidelines and a Sentencing Council were put forward as a way of 
delivering greater transparency, 90 and these proposals were, after considerable judicial 
opposition, enacted in 2010 alongside the presumption against sentences of three 
months or less. However, it is unlikely that a Sentencing Council with the power 
to draft guidelines will even begin to be established soon—almost certainly not 
before autumn 2014 when a referendum will be held on Scottish independence 
from the rest of the UK. At such a sensitive time, ministers are reluctant to confront 
or aggravate the judiciary when that could be portrayed by opponents of independ-
ence as a ‘constitutional crisis’. 91 So despite the rarity of an overall majority in the 
Scottish Parliament, the government is unlikely to press ahead with any plans for 
guidelines before the next general election in 2015. 
 What may be established much sooner than Sentencing Council guidelines is the 
provision to promote greater public ‘awareness and understanding of sentencing 
policy and practice’, a proposal which enjoyed some degree of judicial support. 
 Apart from a short period in the late 1990s, the development of guidelines and 
a guidelines authority in England and Wales has been paralleled in Scotland by 
a relatively cautious approach. While arguments about the need for consistency 
seem to have long been won south of the border, in Scotland leading legal and 
judicial ﬁ gures continue to claim that there is no such thing as consistency because 
cases are incommensurable. 92 Guidelines are treated with a degree of nervousness 
north of the border. Even among groups concerned with penal moderation, sup-
port for systematic guidelines drafted by a Sentencing Council is weak because of 
a somewhat inchoate feeling that guidelines would increase penal severity and a 
belief that this occurred in England and Wales. 93 
 90  Scottish Government, above note 87. 
 91  A ﬂ avour of the sort of rhetorical opposition which could be expected is the assertion that it is a 
constitutional principle that, save for the lightest of statutory framework,  policy belongs to the senior 
judiciary: ‘[T]he central and essential element of these arrangements is the constitutional principle 
that, with limited and speciﬁ c statutory exceptions, the High Court has always been and remains the 
body ultimately responsible for decision-making in the development and implementation of sen-
tencing  policy . We regard that principle, which is well-noted in Scotland, as of the ﬁ rst importance.’ 
(Judges of the High Court of Justiciary: written evidence to the Justice Committee considering the 
Criminal Justice and Licensing Bill 2009, para 8 (emphasis added)). 
 92  For example, the submission to the Justice Committee by the Sheriﬀ s Association (which rep-
resents intermediate court judges) stated that since ‘a sentence is a decision in an individual cases, 
then consistency is a pipe dream, an unachievable goal unless one takes no account of individual 
circumstances’ (Sheriﬀ s’ Association submission to the Justice Committee of the Scottish Parliament 
considering the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Bill 2009, para 2.4). 
 93  See, eg, the written evidence of the Scottish Consortium on Crime and Criminal Justice (roughly 
equivalent to the Penal Aﬀ airs Consortium in England and Wales). ‘[I]n the current climate the 
establishment of a comprehensive system of guidelines runs the risk of the prison population being 
increased.’ (Written evidence to the Scottish Parliament Justice Committee on Criminal Justice and 
Licensing Bill 2009). Th is anxiety in Scotland about the eﬀ ect of guidelines has been given greater 
credence by comparative research. In comparative work widely discussed in Scottish penal policy 
circles, Millie et al, above note 39, compared sentencing in Scotland and England and Wales. Th ey 
suggested, mainly on the basis of interviews with judicial sentencers, that sentencing guidelines south 
of the border have increased penal severity. Eg: ‘It is, therefore, possible that the more developed use 
of guidelines in England and Wales accounts for at least some of greater rate of increase in custody 
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 By and large it is not the case that the ﬁ ve aspirations which inspire, motivate, 
and sustain sentencing reform are not relevant to Scotland. Indeed the self-image 
among liberal elites of Scotland as a more humane, tolerant, welfare-minded, and 
less punitive nation supports the desire for greater penal moderation. However, 
these aspirations have instead found expression through an approach largely 
characterized by the studious avoidance of discussion about judicial sentencing 
per se. 94 Instead, a strategy of information, advice, indirect persuasion, and at 
times surreptitious action has been pursued. Th is is self-consciously portrayed as 
an alternative to the approach of England and Wales, which rightly or wrongly, 
tends to be depicted as less welfare-orientated and more punitive. 95 Th is image has 
been crucial to the political discourse of sentencing reform. 
 D.  Conclusions 
 I have suggested that sentencing reform, including the move to a Council drafting 
guidelines, tends to be inspired and motivated by one or more of ﬁ ve aspirations: 
legal equality including consistency, openness, predictability, the promotion of 
public conﬁ dence, and a change in penal direction (such as greater penal modera-
tion). Th ese aspirations are similarly pertinent to Scotland as they are in England 
and Wales and elsewhere: consistency, public conﬁ dence, and penal moderation 
being the most commonly invoked. Th at said, arguments for consistency appear 
to attract less support in Scotland because of the widely held  assumption that sen-
tencing is more consistent because it is more professional and far less reliant on a 
huge army of lay magistrates. Encouraging greater penal moderation has long been 
a cherished value of criminal justice elites, more so than consistency, and greater 
public conﬁ dence is seen as means to its realization. 
 It seems, on the face of it, somewhat puzzling that Scotland has not followed 
a similar approach to its closest neighbour. However, this is explicable, at least in 
rates and in the lengths of prison sentences.’ (p 261). Millie at al, above note 39, also cite the 2004 
Coulsﬁ eld Inquiry which claimed that ‘there is a growing consensus that the eﬀ ect [of guidelines] has 
been to increase the average length of sentences’. (Coulsﬁ eld, Lord,  Crime, Courts and Conﬁ dence: 
Report of an Independent Inquiry into Alternatives to Prison (2004) at 27). Th is is not to say that this 
perception is necessarily well-founded, but that it is a fairly widely held one north of the border. 
 94  Indeed, it is not uncommon for the argument to be run that judicial ownership of sentencing 
policy protects Scotland against the kind of increased punitiveness seen in England and Wales. For 
example, Millie et al, above note 39, p 263 claim that ‘the concentration of more power in sentencing 
matters within the judiciary in Scotland as compared with England and Wales, together with a rela-
tive absence of political interference, appears to have contributed to the slower rate of increase in the 
prison population in Scotland’. 
 95  Despite this image, we know remarkably little about what impact guidelines in England and 
Wales have had on sentencing practices because until recently the data had not been systematically 
collected, although the Sentencing Council has taken some modest steps to begin to rectify this omis-
sion. Indeed, the prerequisite of impact is compliance and there is little known about what sentencers 
(and others) know and understand (or misunderstand) about guidelines as applied to individual cases. 
Th is is not of course an argument against systematic guidelines—the same could be said of appellate 
court guidance. 
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part, by a series of measures which have seemed to address these aspirations, most 
especially the aspirations of consistency and penal moderation. Th ese measures 
have largely been characterized as a way of achieving reform  without confronting 
judicial ‘ownership’ of sentencing. 96 Instead, during the years when England and 
Wales was developing guideline judgments and institutions, Scotland pursued a 
strategy of encouraging self-regulation (SIS), persuasion (pre-sentence reports), 
surreptitious back-door re-sentencing (executive release), and diversion. To date, 
the only exception to this period has been the minority government of 2007–2011 
when judicial discretion was explicitly suggested as a main reason for the ‘over-use’ 
of imprisonment and the attempt to institute a presumption against short custodial 
sentences together with a Sentencing Council. Th e Council may only be imple-
mented in the medium term and  without the ability to draft guidelines. 
 Intriguingly, it seems that these attempts to reform sentencing through subtle 
and indirect means of persuasion and encouragement may have the best chance of 
success when, for good or for ill, the political environment appears, to the senior 
judiciary at least, to be hostile or places judicial discretion under serious and sus-
tained scrutiny. Th at scrutiny may fail and that environment may lead to wholly 
undesirable consequences. Yet paradoxically, it may also yield positive opportunities 
and judicially led initiatives. If this is so, it implies a provocative question: is the 
best hope for liberal reform the credible threat of proposals which are perceived 
by the senior judiciary to be illiberal and hostile to judicial discretion? Individual 
judges may feel that an initiative might be good, but the Scottish experience 
suggests that there will be no collective judicial action unless a credible threat is 
perceived and the senior judiciary feels it may have something to defend. 
 96  A Ashworth,  Sentencing and Criminal Justice (2005). 
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